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The autonomous vehicle (AV) is one of the first commercialized AI-embedded robots to
make autonomous decisions. Despite technological advancements, unavoidable AV
accidents that result in life-and-death consequences cannot be completely eliminated.
The emerging social concern of how an AV should make ethical decisions during
unavoidable accidents is referred to as the moral dilemma of AV, which has promoted
heated discussions among various stakeholders. However, there are research gaps in
explainable AV ethical decision-making processes that predict how AVs’ moral behaviors
are made that are acceptable from the AV users’ perspectives. This study addresses the
key question: What factors affect ethical behavioral intentions in the AV moral dilemma? To
answer this question, this study draws theories from multidisciplinary research fields to
propose the “Integrative ethical decision-making framework for the AV moral dilemma.”
The framework includes four interdependent ethical decision-making stages: AV moral
dilemma issue framing, intuitive moral reasoning, rational moral reasoning, and ethical
behavioral intention making. Further, the framework includes variables (e.g., perceived
moral intensity, individual factors, and personal moral philosophies) that influence the
ethical decision-making process. For instance, the framework explains that AV users from
Eastern cultures will tend to endorse a situationist ethics position (high idealism and high
relativism), which views that ethical decisions are relative to context, compared to AV users
from Western cultures. This proposition is derived from the link between individual factors
and personal moral philosophy. Moreover, the framework proposes a dual-process
theory, which explains that both intuitive and rational moral reasoning are integral
processes of ethical decision-making during the AV moral dilemma. Further, this
framework describes that ethical behavioral intentions that lead to decisions in the AV
moral dilemma are not fixed, but are based on how an individual perceives the seriousness
of the situation, which is shaped by their personal moral philosophy. This framework
provides a step-by-step explanation of how pluralistic ethical decision-making occurs,
reducing the abstractness of AV moral reasoning processes.
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INTRODUCTION
With recent artificial intelligence (AI) advancements, robots are
expanding from conducting predefined tasks in confined
environments to becoming autonomous agents in real-world
contexts. Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are among the most
significant commercialized AI-embedded autonomous agents
that reflect this technological transition. A report of
Americans’ long-term adoption of AVs forecasts mass
production of AVs with high automation by 2024 (Bansal and
Kockelman, 2017). The adoption of AV promises many benefits
that improve transportation experiences such as reduced costs,
more rest time for vehicle users, mobility to nondrivers, and
minimized pollutions (Schoettle and Sivak, 2014; Fagnant and
Kockelman, 2015). Most importantly, AVs are expected to
increase road safety by reducing the number of accidents and
severity of crash consequences by making more rational decisions
(Anderson et al., 2014; Kumfer and Burgess, 2015; Nyholm and
Smids, 2016; Gogoll and Müller, 2017; Hulse et al., 2018).
Despite these technological advancements, AV accidents
cannot be entirely eliminated (Goodall, 2014b; Bonnefon et al.,
2016; Guo et al., 2018; Nyholm and Smids, 2018). In this regard,
AVs are among the first autonomous agents that make decisions
with potential life-and-death consequences (Awad et al., 2020).
While vehicle accidents have existed, the introduction of AVs has
shifted ethical implications during accidents Danielson (2015),
Shariff et al. (2017), Awad et al. (2018a), Taddeo & Floridi (2018)
because humans and AVs make intrinsically different ethical
decisions. In conventional accidents, human drivers tend to show
crash avoidance behaviors Lerner (1993), Yan et al. (2008) within
2 s of reaction time Lin (2015), resulting in reflexive and
instinctive decisions (Goodall, 2014a). Thus, human decisions
or driving behaviors cannot be held morally accountable
(Goodall, 2014b; Lin, 2015; Shariff et al., 2017). In contrast,
AVs are equipped with advanced sensors and preprogrammed
algorithms that can anticipate and react to accidents better than
human drivers. Therefore, AV decisions that impact human lives
are preprogrammed (Goodall, 2014a; Carsten et al., 2015;
Karnouskos, 2020b). The decision of an AV to protect whom
or what during an emergency falls into distributing harm, a
universally agreed-upon moral domain (Haidt, 2001). As an
AV is an artificial moral agent capable of making decisions
with ethical consequences (Allen et al., 2005; Wallach et al.,
2010), an in-depth understanding of AV ethics is necessary.
The emerging social concern of how AVs should behave
ethically in unavoidable crashes started a heated discussion in
AV ethics, which is referred to as the moral dilemma of AVs
(Bonnefon et al., 2016; Gogoll and Müller, 2017; Goodall, 2014a,
Goodall, 2014b; J. Greene, 2016; Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin,
2015; Lin, 2015; Nyholm and Smids, 2016). The most dominantly
discussed AV ethical issue is based on an extension of the trolley
problem Goodall (2014a), J. Greene (2016), Lin (2015), Shariff
et al. (2017), which asks whether people prefer deontology
(determining good or bad based on a set of rules) or
utilitarianism (determining good or bad based on outcomes)
(Gawronski and Beer, 2017). However, many researchers are
dismissive of AV ethics based on the trolley problem for the
following reasons. First, the hypothetical scenarios adopted in the
thought experiment are too simplified and ambiguous
(Gawronski and Beer, 2017; De Freitas et al., 2020b). In fact,
most scenarios in AV moral dilemmas tend to focus mainly on
the consequences made from predefined binary choices, e.g., the
number or characteristics of people who are impacted. This
approach disregards other important AV crash-related factors
such as regulations, responsibilities, or moral norms. Second, the
results are highly likely to be biased. Trolley problem-based
scenarios often begin by favoring a specific moral theory,
resulting in a biased interpretation of the results (Dubljević
and Racine, 2014). Studies have shown a discrepancy between
people’s preference and acceptance of utilitarian AVs due to this
bias. For instance, people answered that they prefer utilitarian
AVs that save more lives but would not purchase such AVs, as
they might sacrifice themselves (Bonnefon et al., 2016; Shariff
et al., 2017; Awad et al., 2018a). Third, ethical decisions based on
the trolley problem tend to be unfair (Goodall, 2014a; J. Greene,
2016; Taddeo and Floridi, 2018). The results reveal people’s
preferences to determine who to kill based on personal
features (e.g., save women and kill men) Bigman & Gray
(2020), which disregards the equal right to human, an integral
ethical concern (Kochupillai et al., 2020). Further, such unfair
preferences violate the Rule 9 of German Ethics Code for
Automated and Connected Driving, which strictly prohibits
discrimination based on personal features (Luetge, 2017). As a
result, people are angered at AVs that make prejudiced decisions
(De Freitas et al., 2021). Consequently, public fear and outrage
could delay the adoption of AVs (Shariff et al., 2017). Finally,
trolley problem-based AV ethics tends to rely on a single moral
doctrine (e.g., utilitarian). Relying only on one specific moral
principle cannot explain complex real-world values. Indeed,
human morality is pluralistic (Graham et al., 2013; Schoettle
and Sivak, 2014; Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015). Therefore,
providing AV ethical perspectives other than utilitarianism
needs to be considered (Dubljević, 2020). To overcome the
limitations of the trolley problem-based AV ethics, an
alternative approach that incorporates varying human values
and crash contexts should be considered.
Providing explainable AV moral behaviors is essential to
ensuring the transparency of AV systems (J. Greene, 2016).
One way to achieve this goal is to develop an AV framework
that explains and predicts the full ethical decision-making process
Winfield et al. (2019), Karnouskos (2020a) matching end-users’
values (Bonnemains et al., 2018). AV ethics requires a
collaborative and interdisciplinary effort from technical,
regulatory, and social spheres (Borenstein et al., 2019; De
Freitas et al., 2020a; De Freitas et al., 2020b; Mordue et al.,
2020). Therefore, it is integral for various stakeholders (e.g.,
AV developers, engineers, regulators, ethicists, and social
scientists) to have an open discussion about forming value-
aligned moral behaviors of AV Goodall (2014b), De Freitas
et al. (2020b). As AI-based reasoning is a blackbox
Castelvecchi (2016), AV moral reasoning will be challenging
to fully understand, even for those who programmed them.
Furthermore, AVs are mostly elaborated by engineers,
transportation experts, policy makers Bansal and Kockelman,
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(2017) and AI ethicists Vrščaj et al. (2020) lacking prospective AV
users’ values or expectations. Further, experiment results show
that moral judgments on human drivers and AVs were similar
(Kallioinen et al., 2019). Consequently, many researchers
emphasize the importance of including public morality and
preference in AV ethics (Awad et al., 2018b; De Freitas et al.,
2020a; Savulescu et al., 2019; De Freitas et al., 2020a; De Freitas
et al., 2020a). It is important to note that the focus of this study is
limited to understanding acceptable AV moral behaviors for the
public, which has been underexplored. Thus, technical
approaches to implement the system are beyond the scope of
this research.
The study that observed lay drivers’ moral reasoning showed
that moral emotions are an important part of moral judgment
during the AV moral dilemma (Rhim et al., 2020). Accordingly, a
comprehensive ethical decision-making framework that explains
both intuitive and rational aspects of AV ethical behaviors that
answers the following research questions is required: What
factors affect ethical behavioral intentions in the AV moral
dilemma? How do these variables shape ethical behavioral
intentions? To answer these questions, this study aims to
synthesize a framework that uses the dual-process theory of
moral reasoning Greene et al. (2001) to explain and predict
pluralistic moral reasoning in the AV moral dilemma.
This study attempts to provide descriptive ethics to enhance
understanding of the broad ethical phenomena of the AV moral
dilemma by providing a conceptual framework with propositions.
The assumption that acceptable or understandable AV behaviors
can be learned from the existing data should be avoided De
Freitas et al. (2020b), because there are not enough AV crash cases
and the discussion of acceptable AV moral behaviors is not
finalized. As a result, it is neither possible nor realistic to
provide normative guidance that lists how AVs “ought to”
behave. Moreover, the established normative AV ethics may
not be adequate as AV technology would advance in
unexpected ways, or user values may evolve while using the
technology. Also, once AVs are embedded in daily lives, it
would be difficult to modify AV decisions and policies (Vrščaj
et al., 2020). Thus, making normative ethical rules should be done
with caution (Dubljević, 2020). In summary, the purpose of this
research is to propose a comprehensive conceptual framework
called the “Integrative ethical decision-making framework for the
AV moral dilemma,” which theorizes that individual
characteristics and perceived seriousness of the AV moral
dilemma are antecedents of intuitive and rational moral
judgments. The contributions of this study are as follows.
First, this study provides explanations for the dual-process
theory of ethical decision-making during the AV moral
dilemma by including both the cognitive and affective
mechanisms as integral aspects of AV ethics. Second, this
study emphasizes the importance of how the issue is framed
instead of focusing only on the impact of a specific moral doctrine
to explain flexible and versatile moral judgment during the AV
moral dilemma. Last, this study provides a holistic view of how
ethical decision-making occurs in the unknown and vague
context of the AV moral dilemma, by providing definitions of
moderating variables with explanations and propositions.
BACKGROUND
Review of Theoretical Ethical
Decision-Making Approaches
Extending human morality literature into artificial agents may
facilitate the articulation of computational models (Wallach,
2010; Malle, 2016; Cervantes et al., 2020). Therefore, having a
comprehensive understanding of the existing moral judgment
theories is crucial to building realistic and accountable AV ethical
behaviors. The definition of ethical decision-making is “a process
by which individuals use their moral base to determine whether a
certain issue is right or wrong” (Carlson et al., 2009, p. 536).
Researchers frommultiple disciplines have proposed a number of
theoretical and conceptual frameworks to explain, predict, and
learn about human moral reasoning. Although moral judgment
models are not specifically devised to explain AV ethics, some of
the representative models have evolved over several decades to
provide comprehensiveness to explain complex moral dilemma
scenarios, which offers general applicability to other fields (S. D.
Hunt and Vitell, 2006). Therefore, understanding the human
moral reasoning will provide possible explanations of how moral
judgment will occur in the AV moral dilemma.
Traditional moral reasoning approaches are based on
rationalist approaches, which posit that people make conscious
and intentional ethical decisions (Vitell, 2003). Recently, social
psychologists began to focus on the nonrational or intuitionist
approaches in moral reasoning by emphasizing the importance of
intuition and emotions in moral reasoning (Haidt, 2001;
Sonenshein, 2007; Dubljević et al., 2018). Therefore, this study
attempts to gain significant insights from a theoretical
investigation of the dual-process theory Haidt (2001),
Kahneman (2003), Evans (2008), Zollo (2020) by
understanding both the rationalist and intuitive approaches to
explain socially acceptable AV ethical behaviors.
The Rationalist Approach
Rest’s model has inspired rationalist ethical decision-making
frameworks in the literature across many disciplines (Beu and
Buckley, 2001; Dubinsky and Loken, 1989; Ferrell and Gresham,
1985; S. D. Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Jones, 1991; Trevino, 1986).
The rationalist approach of ethical decision-making can be
summarized as representing a cognitive perspective of an
individual, which is rational, controlled, deliberate, intentional,
and conscious. The most widely acknowledged ethical decision-
making framework is the four-component model by Rest (1986),
which is the foundation of most models (Groves et al., 2008).
Rest’s model, as well as the majority of ethical decision-making
frameworks, begins when a person recognizes that there is an
ethical issue, which is called the Recognize Moral Issue phase. If an
ethical issue has been recognized, an individual’s reasoning
moves on to the next step of Make Moral Judgment, which is
an individual’s cognitive process to “judge which course of action
is morally right” (Trevino, 1992, p.445), then the third step called
Establish Moral Intent follows. This is a cognitive moral
development phase that occurs after making a moral judgment
Kohlberg (1969), Rest (1986), in which people prioritize their
moral values to determine appropriate ethical behaviors. The last
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step is Engage in Moral Behavior, in which an individual makes
actions based on his or her moral intentions. These four phases
describe the moral reasoning of individuals to be “intentionally
rationalize, re-evaluate, and justify, moral standards, rules of
conduct, and moral life” (Zollo et al., 2018, p.694).
The following are the examples of rationalist ethical decision-
making frameworks from the multidisciplinary literature that are
based on Rest’s (1986) Model. The contingency framework by
Ferrell and Gresham (1985) describes that an individual’s moral
reasoning begins when he or she faces an ethical salient context.
This model synthesizes multiple variables to explain whether an
individual’s behavior is ethical or unethical. An individual’s moral
reasoning is influenced by the following factors: individual
(i.e., knowledge, values, attitudes, intentions), significant others
(i.e., differential association, role set configuration), and
opportunity (i.e., professional codes, corporate policy, rewards/
punishment). This model also includes social and cultural
environmental factors that shape an individual’s ethical
intentions. The Person-Situation Interactionist model by
Trevino (1986) implements the stage of Kohlberg’s cognitive
moral development (Kohlberg, 1969) as an integral predictor
of ethical behavior. Moral judgment in Trevino’s model is
moderated by both an individual moderator (i.e., ego strength,
field of dependence, and locus of control) and a situational
moderator (i.e., immediate job context, organizational culture,
characteristic of the work). The general theory of marketing ethics
of Hunt and Vitell (1986) was developed to reduce the ethics gap
between the marketers and the society by providing a general
ethical decision-making theory with a visible process model (S. D.
Hunt and Vitell, 2006). This model is similar to the Contingency
framework by Ferrell and Gresham, (1985) as both acknowledge
the impact of external factors (i.e., cultural, industry, and
organizational environment) and individual factors in moral
judgment. However, the Hunt and Vitell (1986) model
explains that individuals use specific moral doctrines
(deontological or teleological) to evaluate and determine
ethical consequences during perceived ethical problem stages.
That is, this model puts emphasis on the micro aspects of an
individual’s cognitive decision-making process. Jones’ (1991)
issue-contingent model includes the four moral reasoning
phases like other models and proposes that environmental
factors and individual factors positively impact the ethical
decision-making phases. On top of this, Jones (1991)
emphasizes the moral intensity of a particular context (see
Table 1) for further definitions and application for AV ethics).
A comprehensive rationalist ethical decision-making framework
is illustrated in (Figure 1). While these models provide variables
and their relations that explain how individuals perform moral
reasoning, they focus on a rationalist approach. Thus, the
rationalist approach does not consider the role of emotions or
intuitions, which are integral components of moral value codes
derived in the AV moral dilemma (Rhim et al., 2020).
The Intuitionist Approach
Researchers have realized that the dominant rational perspective
fails to convey the full spectrum of the ethical decision-making
processes (Chatzidakis et al., 2018; Cherry and Caldwell, 2013;
Yacout and Vitell, 2018). The premise that moral agents are
rational decision makers disregards the impact of nonrational or
intuitive elements such as emotions and intuition in moral
judgment (Sonenshein, 2007; Ruedy et al., 2013; Chowdhury,
2017). Consequently, researchers began to acknowledge the
significance of intuitive approaches in ethical decision-making,
which include consideration of moral values, emotions, and
intuitions (Cherry and Caldwell, 2013; Dedeke, 2015; Haidt,
2001; Haidt and Joseph, 2004; Zollo, forthcoming; Zollo et al.,
2017). Haidt (2001) defines moral intuition as “the sudden
appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including
an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any
conscious awareness of having gone through steps of
searching, weight evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (p.818).
The dual-process theory of human cognition Kahneman
(2003), Evans (2008) explains that moral intuition is an
automatic response antecedent to rational moral reasoning
(Haidt, 2001; Sonenshein, 2007). The social intuitionist model
Haidt (2001), among the most well-known intuitionist models,
adopts the dual-process theory and accentuates the role of moral
intuition as the initial stage in moral reasoning (Greene et al.,
2001; Cushman et al., 2006; Zollo et al., 2017). The theory
explains that when the decision maker experiences a morally
salient context, he or she makes moral judgments based on
intuitions, followed by the post hoc rationalization of moral
reasoning. In summary, Haidt (2001) explains that emotive
intuition occurs quickly and effortlessly, whereas cognitive
reasoning occurs slowly and requires efforts.
Another well-known dual process theory includes the notion of
System 1 and System 2 (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003). Under this
theory, human cognition comprises two information processing




The participant is a driver (V1) who is driving a truck at a
two-lane road in a rural area. There are three small
passenger cars (V2, V3, and V4) and a truck (V5) on the
road. Suddenly, (V2) is changing lane, and a head-on
collision with (V1) is expected. There are two crash options
with known consequences, and the participant has to
choose an option from the perspective of the driver (V1)
The truck (V1) brakes and turns right. This will lead to a
collision between the truck (V1) and a small passenger
car (V2). As a result, the driver of (V1) will get a minor
injury, while the driver of (V2) has died
Whether to make a self-protecting decision that
results in the death of the negligent driver
The truck (V1) turns right. This will lead (V1) to deviate off
the road and collide into a utility pole. As a result, the
driver of (V1) will be seriously injured while all the other
drivers are intact
Whether to make a utilitarian decision to save a life
on behalf of sacrificing oneself when one is not at
fault
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systems, which also apply to the ethical decision-making process
(Zollo, 2020). System 1 is the intuitive, effortless, fast, reflexive, and
nonconscious cognitive process (Dane and Pratt, 2007). “Intuiting”
can be interpreted as System 1, which allows a moral agent tomake a
holistic and intuitive moral judgment during dynamic and uncertain
situations (Dane and Pratt, 2007). The next phase, System 2, is the
controlled, reflective, and analytical cognitive moral reasoning
process (Zollo et al., 2017). Basic emotions that arise effortlessly
and unconsciously are part of System 1 (i.e., fear, surprise, and
sadness), whereas System 2 includesmore complex emotions that are
derived from deliberate, and rational cognition (i.e., disgust, anguish,
relief, and embarrassment) (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Zollo et al.,
2017). Adopted from Zollo (2020), Figure 2 shows the dual process
of ethical decision-making, which includes both moral intuition
(System 1) and cognitive moral reasoning (System 2). Amore recent
study in neuroethics introduced the Agent–Deed–Consequence
(ADC) model of moral judgment, which follows an integrative
approach to explain moral intuitions (Dubljević and Racine,
2014). More specifically, the ADC model posits that “moral
judgment relies on positive and negative evaluations of three
different components of moral intuitions: the character of a
person; their actions; and the consequences brought about by the
given situation” (Dubljević et al., 2018, p.2). The ADC model is
simple yet effective in verifying and explaining whether a behavior is
ethical or not. Overall, the moral intuitionists Cushman et al.(2006),
Greene et al. (2001), Haidt (2001), Sonenshein (2007), Tenbrunsel
and Smith-Crowe (2008), Zollo (2020), Zollo et al. (2017) agree that
“moral judgments arise as intuitions generated by automatic
cognitive processes, and that the primary role of conscious
reasoning is not to generate moral judgments, but to provide a
post hoc basis for a moral justification” (Cushman et al., 2006, p.
1982). Recent literature on the ethics indicates that considering both
the rationalist and intuitive approaches provides a complete
understanding of human moral reasoning. Moreover, as AV
accidents impose hazards for both individual AV user and the
traffic users around the AV user, consideration of intuitive moral
judgment along with rational judgment to consider overall impact
for the society is important. Consequently, the AV ethics should be
in line with the dual-process theory and consider both the rational
and intuitive moral judgment phases to discuss socially acceptable
AV morality.
Linking Ethical Decision-Making and AV
Ethics
The various ethical decision-making frameworks listed in the
previous sections are effective at providing explanations for how
moral reasoning variables shape an individual’s ethical intentions.
FIGURE 1 | Rationalist approach of ethical decision-making.
FIGURE 2 | Dual-process model of ethical decision-making (Source: Zollo, 2020, p.7).
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Many researchers agree with the necessity of formulating AV
ethics frameworks for varying reasons. First, providing a formal
specification of AV moral behaviors will aid other traffic users
(e.g., cyclists and pedestrians) to have a better understanding of
AVs (Dogan et al., 2016; Mermet and Simon, 2016). Second, an
appropriate AV ethics framework helps decision-makers advance
responsible AVs that align with societal values, Stilgoe et al.
(2013), which can mitigate conflicts between potential harms
when adopting AVs (Leikas et al., 2019; Vrščaj et al., 2020). Third,
a comprehensive AV ethics model will facilitate translating vague
real-world moral theories into machine operationalizable codes
by reducing abstractness (Bonnemains et al., 2018).
Several AV ethics frameworks were developed in an attempt to
fulfill these goals. Karnouskos (2020b) has utilized the utilitarian
principle to explain the acceptance of AVs. Although this model
is based on empirical findings, it relies only on a single ethical
approach, which can lead to biased decisions. To overcome this
limitation, Karnouskos (2020a) has verified that multiple moral
frameworks (e.g., utilitarianism, deontology, relativism,
absolutism, and pluralism) impact the acceptance of AVs.
However, these models do not take into consideration
situational or individual factors that impact ethical decision-
making. While Smith (2019) has concluded that personality
(Honest-Humility vs. Conscientiousness) and ethics positions
(Idealism vs. Relativism) impact moral judgment during AV
accidents, the model has a gap in explaining the procedural
relationships among the variables. The “Generalized
Framework for moral dilemmas Involving AV” categorizes
layers of factors (cast of characters, vehicle assemblage, and
perspective) and suggests four research agendas (Novak, 2020).
However, Novak’s model does not have clear definitions of
concepts and their interrelations that explain the moral
judgment process. While the aforementioned AV frameworks
aim to provide accountable and transparent AV ethics, these
models do not consider intuitive moral reasoning phases.
Furthermore, these models cannot explain the pluralistic
ethical decision-making of AV ethics required in complex and
dynamic real-world crash contexts. To provide holistic
explanations of ethical decision-making during the AV moral
dilemma, this study aims to develop a comprehensive AV ethics
framework by integrating both the intuitionist and rationalist
moral reasoning approaches and understanding how individual
and situational characteristics affect ethical decision-making
phases.
METHODOLOGY
The theorization of explainable pluralistic AV ethical decision-
making is based on the conceptual analysis method to “generate,
identify, and trace a phenomenon’s major concepts, which
together constitute its theoretical framework” by linking
together knowledge from multidisciplinary backgrounds
(Jabareen, 2009, p.53). A conceptual framework is the end
result of this method, which provides a broader understanding
of the phenomenon of interest by providing explanations of
possible relationships between concepts (Imenda, 2014; Liehr
and Smith, 1999). Moreover, a conceptual framework lays a
foundation for research questions and hypotheses for further
investigation (McGaghie et al., 2001). This study follows the
research stages of Eizenberg and Jabareen (2017), Jabareen (2009)
to develop “Integrative ethical decision-making framework for
the AV moral dilemma” depicted in Figure 3. First,
multidisciplinary literature was reviewed in search of relevant
concepts for the AV moral dilemma (e.g., ethics, psychology,
sociology, traffic, law, machine ethics, and AI ethics). Second, the
reviewed literature was categorized. As the moral reasoning
process occurs when an individual perceives a morally salient
context, the literature was classified to identify three initial
categories: moral reasoning phases, individual factors, and
situational factors impacting ethical decisions during the AV
moral dilemma. Third, specific concepts were identified. For the
moral reasoning category, four interdependent ethical decision-
making stages were defined. Both intuitive and rational moral
judgment stages were included to describe the dual-process and
pluralistic nature of human moral reasoning. Concepts and
propositions for both intuitive and rational moral judgment
stages include moral value codes that were derived from the
AV moral dilemma ethical decision-making process (Rhim et al.,
2020). For the individual factors categories, concepts that describe
the characteristics and ethical stance of an individual were
identified. For situational factors impacting the moral
reasoning phases, a variable called perceived moral intensity
(PMI) was selected, which evaluates multiple aspects of the
AV moral dilemma. PMI includes the perception of risk and
uncertainty, important features to consider during AV accidents
Kruegel and Uhl (2020); therefore, these two latter concepts were
not included separately. Last, the selected concepts were
synthesized to provide a comprehensive explanation of how
ethical behavioral intentions are shaped during AV moral
dilemmas. Further descriptions of the “Integrative ethical
decision-making framework for the AV moral dilemma” will
be provided in the next section.
THE PROPOSED MODEL: INTEGRATED AV
ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING
FRAMEWORK
No matter how complicated AVs are, they are products that can
be represented as an extension of their users, owners, or
occupants, as the driving task of AV is becoming a
comanaged task with humans (Smith, 2019; Bellet et al., 2011).
Therefore, the authors posit that AV users will better understand,
accept, and trust AVs that make moral judgments similar to
oneself. To explain the AV ethical decision-making process
during the AV moral dilemma, we have reformulated an
integrative ethical decision-making model that includes both
the rationalist and intuitive approaches based on previous
models (Singhapakdi et al., 1999; Haidt, 2001; Dedeke, 2015;
Schwartz, 2016; Zollo, 2020). Aligned with Haidt (2001), Zollo
(2020), our framework is descriptive, which describes how people
are likely to make ethical intentions during the AV moral
dilemma. This study defines the AV moral dilemma as an
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org May 2021 | Volume 8 | Article 6323946
Rhim et al. Integrative Ethical Decision-Making Framework
unavoidable crash situation in which an AV user must reflect
upon competing moral standards and determine the appropriate
moral behavior of an AV. Moreover, this model posits that moral
judgment will vary depending on the individual (e.g., different
individuals may perceive varied levels of moral saliency when
faced with the same AV moral dilemmas) and situational
characteristics (e.g., the same individual may behave differently
depending on the characteristic of AV moral dilemma one is
facing). The ADC model (Dubljević and Racine, 2014) is one of
the most up-to-date and effective models to explain the flexible
moral judgment of AVs and overcome the limitation of relying
only on utilitarian AV ethics (Dubljević, 2020). The framework
developed in this study is complementary to the ADC model. As
the components of the ADC model indicate, the model assesses
ethical consequences based on deeds of agents. While the Theory
of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) links intention and behavior,
studies in ethics demonstrate that how an individual intends to
act may not necessarily lead to actual ethical behaviors during the
moral dilemma (Weber and Gillespie, 1998). Consequently,
understanding ethical intentions will provide further insights
into why a certain ethical behavior or deed occurs. The
“Integrated AV ethical decision-making framework”
(Figure 3) in this study describes how ethical behavioral
intentions are shaped with specific variables that need to be
considered during the AV moral dilemma.
The “Integrated AV ethical decision-making framework”
consists of two major components:1) the ethical decision-
making process (intuitive and rational) and 2) variables (or
factors) that influence the ethical decision-making process.
The ethical decision-making process is composed of four
stages: AV moral dilemma issue framing, intuitive moral
reasoning, rational moral reasoning, and ethical behavioral
intention making stages which reflect Rest’s (1986) basic
process framework. The ethical decision-making variables
include 1) individual factors and 2) personal moral philosophy
(PMP), and 3) perceived moral intensity (PMI). The model
consists of 9 links, which are shown in arrows in Figure 3.
The solid boxes represent mental state, and the dotted boxes
represent mental processes. The current model assumes that
accountable ethical behavior of an AV is contingent on the
particular AV moral dilemma context that an individual faces.
In summary, the “Integrated AV ethical decision-making
framework” explains pluralistic nature of AV ethics by
investigating how context-specific ethical intentions are shaped
during the AV moral dilemmas.
AV Moral Dilemma Issue Framing Stage
It is widely accepted that moral judgment is based on how an
individual perceives the moral issue rather than the actual
characteristics of the issues (Jones, 1991; Robin et al., 1996;
A. E. Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999; Trevino, 1986). That is, the
situational context impacts an individual’s unique moral frame,
which is a key component in the ethical decision-making
process. It is highly likely that each AV crash’s
characteristics will be unique (e.g., number of passengers in
the car, severity of the injury, damage done to one’s vehicle,
liability, relationship to the injured victims), and understanding
how an individual frames the specific AV moral dilemma is
important. According to Rhim et al. (2020), how participants
framed the moral issue impacted their AV moral dilemma
decisions. For instance, in the AV moral dilemma vignette
three (see Table 2; Figure 4) that involved the conflict
between making a self-protecting decision or following a
utilitarian doctrine to minimize the overall harm, the
individual’s moral value code (e.g., Harm Mitigation vs. Self-
Preservation) determined their decisions. Furthermore, locus of
control is known to impact the moral issue framing stage (Forte,
2005; Dedeke, 2015). In the case of AV moral dilemma, when
the locus of control was perceived as internal (making decisions
in the first-person perspective), participants’ ethical decisions
varied (e.g., moral values: kin-preservation, pedestrian-
preservation, physical harm avoidance, and responsibility
distribution) (Rhim et al., 2020).
All these findings support the inclusion of the moral issue
framing stage from the first-person perspective as the initial stage
of ethical decision-making in the AV moral dilemma, in
compliance with the Cognitive-Intuitionist Model (Dedeke,
2015). Moral issue framing in this framework posits that
individuals organize the characteristics of moral issues based
on the perceived seriousness of the AV moral dilemma, which
is impacted by individual characteristics. Hence, the following
proposition can be made:
FIGURE 3 | Integrative ethical decision-making framework for the AV moral dilemma.
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Link 1: The AV user frames the characteristics of moral issues
based on his or her perceived seriousness of the AV moral
dilemma.
The Consequence of Perceived Moral Intensity of AV
Moral Dilemma
Extensive studies show that the characteristics of a moral issue
will impact the ethical decision-making process. Characteristics
of moral issues can be measured or described by moral intensity,
which is defined as “a construct that captures the extent of issues-
related moral imperative in a situation” (Jones, 1991, p.372).
Moral intensity is composed of six components. See Table 2 for a
definition of each component with examples in the AV moral
dilemma. This framework focuses on perceived moral intensity
(PMI) because it is effective for describing moral perceptions that
vary across situations and individuals. For instance, while an
individual perceives the moral issue to be of high moral intensity,
another individual might perceive the identical issue as being of
low moral intensity (Robin et al. (1996) depending on his or her
individual characteristics and perceptions of the context (further
TABLE 2 | Definition of moral intensity factors.






“Sum of harms (or benefits) done to victims (or beneficiaries) of the moral
act in question” (p. 374)
The AV’s decision that causes the death of a person is more
consequential than the one that causes a minor injury
Social consensus “The degree of social agreement that a proposed act is evil (or good)”
(p. 375)
The AV’s decision to protect law-abiding pedestrians has a greater
social consensus than a decision to protect the AV driver who has
caused the accident
Probability of effect “A joint function of the probability that the act in question will actually take
place and the act in question will actually cause the harm (benefit)
predicted” (p. 375)
The AV’s decision that has the 10%probability of causing a serious injury
to one passenger has a lower probability of effect than the decision that
causes minor injury to all passengers with 100% probability
Temporal immediacy “The length of time between the present and the onset of consequences
of the moral act in question (shorter length of time implies greater
immediacy)” (p. 376)
AV that causes harm to 1% of traffic users within 5 years has higher
temporal immediacy than AV that harms 1% of traffic users within
20 years
Proximity “The feeling of nearness (social, cultural, psychological, or physical) that
the moral agent has for victims (beneficiaries) of the evil (beneficial) act in
question” (p. 376)
The AV’s decision that harms a passenger who is a family member has a
higher proximity effect than when the effect will be experienced by a
stranger in a different vehicle
Concentration of
effect
“The moral act is an inverse function of the number of people affected by
an act of given magnitude” (p. 377)
The AV’s decision that leads to 10 fatalities has a higher concentrated
effect than causing fatalities to 5 people
FIGURE 4 | AV moral dilemma: a rural two-lane road (source: Rhim et al., 2020, p. 45).
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explained in upcoming sections). Specifically, we posit that an AV
moral dilemma that triggers high PMI will cause more extensive
moral judgment cycles, while situations that prompt low PMI will
lead to less in-depth moral judgment. Furthermore, empirical
studies have shown a significant correlation between PMI and
moral intents (Dubinsky and Loken, 1989; Ferrell et al., 1998;
May and Pauli, 2002; Singhapakdi et al., 1999). Hence, this model
expects that PMI will impact the ethical behavioral intent stage. In
summary, this model specifies PMI as an integral variable that
shapes ethical decision-making in the AV moral dilemma.
Specifically, the characteristics of an AV accident will impact
how an AV occupant frames the moral issue, which in turn will
impact moral judgment and ethical behavioral intentions.
The Antecedents of Perceived Moral Intensity
PMI focuses on the exogenous characteristics of the moral
situation, excluding traits of the moral decision-maker such as
values, knowledge, or moral development (Ferrell and Gresham,
1985; Jones, 1991; Kohlberg, 1969). Therefore, AV users’ innate
variables impacting PMP will be explored in the following
section.
AV User’s Personal Moral Philosophy
Many researchers agree that a decision-maker will utilize ethical
guidelines based on their personal moral philosophy (PMP)
during ethically salient situations (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985;
D. R. Forsyth, 1980; D. R. Forsyth et al., 1988, 2008; A.
Singhapakdi et al., 1999; Vitell et al., 1993). Based on the
established study results, this model presupposes that AV
users will apply ethical guidelines based on their PMP when
making ethical evaluations in AV moral dilemmas.
Forsyth (1980) explains that the predictors of an individual’s
moral judgments can be described by two nomothetic dimensions
of PMP: relativism and idealism. Relativism indicates “the extent
to which the individual rejects universal rules” when making
ethical decisions. That is, relativists base their moral judgments
on skepticism and “generally feel that moral actions depend upon
the nature of the situation and individuals involved . . .more than
the ethical principle that was violated” (Forsyth, 1992, p.462). On
the other hand, idealists have “concern for the welfare of others
. . . feel that harming others is always avoidable, and they would
rather not choose between the lesser of two evils which will lead to
negative consequences for other people” (Forsyth, 1992, p.462).
Moreover, idealists feel that “desirable consequences can, with the
‘right’ action, always be obtained’’ (Forsyth, 1980, p.176). That is,
idealists are moral optimists who value altruism.
Forsyth (1980) has classified four dichotomized ethical
perspectives based on both dimensions rather than classifying
individuals as either relativistic or idealistic, which is called the
Ethics Position (see Figure 5). An individual’s Ethics Position
(Forsyth, 1980) is formed over a lifetime of experiences and has a
strong impact on an individual’s decision-making in a morally
salient situation (D. R. Forsyth, 1980; D. R. Forsyth et al., 2008).
Research results over the past 2 decades show relatively consistent
findings. Idealism had an overall positive relation to moral
judgment, whereas relativism had an overall negative relation
to ethical decision-making (O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2013).
Moreover, PMP has been empirically tested to operate through
PMI (D. Forsyth, 1985; D. Forsyth and Pope, 1984; A.
Singhapakdi et al., 1999). Based on the previous studies, this
model explains that PMP will impact PMI in the AV moral
dilemma. Further, this study proposes that AV occupants who
score higher in idealism (e.g., who aim to secure the overall
welfare of road sharers) and lower in relativism (e.g., who
prioritizes protecting oneself more over others) will be more
sensitive to ethical issues than their counterparts. Hence, we
propose the following propositions:
Link 2a. PMP of AV user impacts PMI of AV moral dilemma.
-A more idealistic AV user will have a higher PMI than a less
idealistic AV user
-A more relativistic AV user will have a lower PMI than a less
relativistic AV user
AV User’s Individual Factors as Antecedent of Personal
Moral Philosophy
Singhapakdi et al. (1999) emphasized the role of individual
characteristics in shaping PMP, which impact PMI and ethical
decision-making processes. This study will explore the following
individual and cultural factors that are likely to impact PMI in the
AV moral dilemma: 1) Socioeconomic status (SES): income and
education, 2) culture (or nationality), and 3) driving experience.
Moreover, this model posits that individual characteristics impact
the moral issue framing stage, which aligns with the model of
(Sonenshein, 2007). Thus, the following proposition is developed:
Link 2b: Individual factors impact the moral issue framing
stage of the AV moral dilemma.
Socioeconomic status.Income Despite the scarcity of previous
studies, it is essential to explore the impact of SES on the
perception of AV ethics for the following reasons. As SES
affects AV users’ acceptance of adopting AVs (wealthier
people tend to favor and anticipate the adoption of AVs
more) (Webb et al., 2019), it is more likely that users with
higher SES will adopt AVs first. When a new product or
FIGURE 5 | Taxonomy of ethical ideologies (Source: Forsyth, 1980,
p. 176).
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service is deployed, it is natural that feedback from the initial
users will be incorporated to modify the product or service. In
general, income tends to rise with the advancement of education
levels. Relatively few studies explored the impact of income on
ethical decision-making. Among a few empirical results, Pratt
(1991) found a consistent tendency for higher salary individuals
to be more sensitive to unethical actions than those with lower
salaries. Moreover, Singhapakdi et al. (1999) found that salary
was negatively related to relativism. Similarly, the ethical
perceptions of AV users who are higher in SES are highly
likely to be referenced more for modifying the ethical
behaviors of AVs. Therefore, before an actual system is
implemented, it is imperative to explore the PMP of a wide
range of SES, which in turn would impact the overall perception
of the ethical decision-making process of AVs.
Link 2b-1: Income will have an impact on PMP.
-AV users with higher income will be more idealistic than AV
users with lower income
-AV users with higher income will be less relativistic than AV
users with lower incomeEducation Studies in ethics have
included education (types and number of years) as a
variable that impacts ethical decision-making because
education is linked to an individual’s cognitive moral
development stages (Rest, 1986). Some study results showed
significant differences in moral reasoning among individuals
with different education levels (Wimalasiri et al., 1996; Latif,
2001; Kracher et al., 2002). For instance, Sparks and Hunt
(1998) found that individuals with more domain knowledge
were more ethically sensitive than novices. Cole and Smith
(1996) found that less educated individuals were more
accepting of ethically questionable statements than more
educated people. Moreover, people showed a significant
difference in recognition of ethical scenarios after receiving
education (Wu, 2003).
Singhapakdi et al. (1999, p.23) explain that education shows a
noticeable impact on PMP, because “with education may come
greater sensitivity to alternative points of view, skepticism
regarding moral absolutes, and pessimism that moral
dilemmas can always have desirable outcomes.” Moreover,
ethical decision-makers in higher education are conventionally
at higher moral development levels, thus becoming more aware of
people holding varying values or rules that can be relative to one’s
norm (Kholberg, 1969). Likewise, AV users with higher education
levels are likely situated at higher stages of moral development,
which enables consideration of the overall impact of crash
consequences. For these reasons, the following propositions
are developed:
Link 2b-2: The education level of an AV user will have an
impact on PMP.
-More educated AV users are less idealistic than less educated
AV users
-More educated AV users will be more relativistic than less
educated AV usersCulture It is widely accepted that culture
influences an individual’s perception of moral dilemmas and
the ethical decision-making process (Ferrell and Gresham,
1985; Graham et al., 2013; Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Hunt and
Vitell, 2006). Further, it would be neither feasible nor
acceptable to develop universally agreed upon AV ethics, as
preferred moral decisions vary depending on cultures or
countries (Awad et al., 2018b; De Freitas et al., 2020b;
Dubljević, 2020). There are various definitions for culture,
but one of the most accepted definitions is by Hofstede,
which defines culture as “the collective programming of the
mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category
of people from another” (Hofstede et al., 2005, p.516). As
culture includes values, shared beliefs, norms, and ideals
Reidenbach and Robin (1991), moral obligations that are
socially acceptable in one culture are rejected in other
societies, despite the existence of universal moral principles
(Mikhail, 2007). Moreover, cross-cultural studies in AV ethics
indicated that people from different cultural backgrounds
favored different AV moralities (Awad et al., 2018a;
Ranasinghe et al., 2020; Rhim et al., 2020).
Forsyth et al. (2008) conducted a meta-analysis to investigate
cultural differences by measuring the level of PMP. The review of
139 studies (29 nations, total n  30,230) revealed that idealism
and relativism levels vary across cultures in predictable ways and
dominant ethics positions existed in each culture: Western
culture (subjectivism), Eastern cultures (situationism), and
Middle Eastern cultures (absolutism and situationism). The
variations of idealism and relativism tend to be uniform with
cultural characteristics (e.g., Hofstede and McCrae, 2004;
Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Forsyth et al. (2008) explain that
regarding idealism, it is predicted thatWestern cultures adopt less
idealistic moral philosophies compared to the Eastern cultures,
which can be explained by individualism (a defining
characteristic of Western culture). Individualism focuses on
the independence of each individual and allows the pursuit of
autonomy and free will among groups, whereas collectivism (a
defining characteristic of Eastern Culture) prioritizes the goal or
well-being of a group before an individual. Thus, Eastern cultures
that accentuate a sense of collectivism imply higher idealism than
Western cultures. In terms of relativism, it is expected that
Eastern cultures will be more relativistic than Western
cultures. Eastern cultures tend to be more contextual and
relational in comparison with Western cultures (Forsyth et al.,
2008). In terms of ethics position, situationism (high idealism and
high relativism, see Figure 3) is dominant in Eastern cultures.
Situationists posit that an individual should act to secure the most
beneficial consequences for all the group members, even if such a
consequence is the result of violating moral rules. The
situationists’ moral outlook can be described by ethical
skepticism or value pluralism, which suggests that the
consequences of an action can determine the situation’s moral
values (D. R. Forsyth, 1992). On the other hand, Western
cultures’ dominant ethics position classification is exceptionist
(low idealism and low relativism, see Figure 3), which posits that
an individual fundamentally seeks to follow moral rules but is
open to pragmatic results. The exceptionist moral outlook highly
corresponds to “rule-utilitarianism,” which indicates that “moral
principles are useful because they provide a framework for
making choices and acting in a way that will tend to produce
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the best consequences for all concerned” (Forsyth, 1992, p. 463).
Cross-cultural studies in AV ethics showed similar patterns.
Eastern cultures showed a higher tendency to make context-
dependent decisions during AV moral dilemmas (Rhim et al.,
2020). On the other hand, theWesterns culture showed a stronger
tendency to spare a greater number of people during the AV
moral dilemma Awad et al. (2018b), Rhim et al. (2020), which
corresponds to the exceptionist moral outlook. In summary, it is
expected that cultural background can have a general impact on
PMP. Hence, the following propositions are provided:
Link 2b-3: The cultural background of an AV user will have an
impact on their PMP.
-AV users from Eastern cultures will tend to be more idealistic
than AV users from Western cultures
-AV users from Eastern cultures will tend to be more
relativistic than AV users from Western cultures
-AV users from Western cultures will generally endorse an
exceptionist ethics position (Low idealism, Low relativism)
-AV users from Eastern cultures will generally endorse a
situationist ethics position (High idealism, High
relativism)Driving Experience Crashes caused by teen
drivers comprise a major part of conventional vehicle
collisions. The causes of teen crashes include
inexperience in driving and underestimation of perilous
driving behaviors (Williams, 2003; Rhodes and Pivik,
2011). Conversely, older drivers are likely to have more
experience and have driven longer distances, thus are likely
to have experienced situations with a greater variety of
ethical problems. As studies that investigate the correlation
between ethical decision-making and driving experiences
are underexplored, the current study will refer to ethics
studies that explored age as a predictor of ethical decision-
making, as age and driving experience have a possible
association. According to a meta-analysis, more than
twenty studies have observed a positive relationship
between age and ethical decision-making (O’Fallon and
Butterfield, 2013). Study results show that older individuals
tend to be more ethically sensitive than younger
individuals (Karcher, 1996; Deshpande, 1997; Peterson
et al., 2001). Furthermore, older generations made more
ethical decisions than younger generations (Hunt and
Jennings, 1997; Lund, 2000; Kim and Chun, 2003). In
terms of PMP, the literature reveals that a negative
association between age and relativism exists, whereas
the findings for idealism are inconsistent (D. R. Forsyth,
1980; Ho et al., 1997; Vitell et al., 1991). In summary, it is
expected that AV users with more driving experience (both
direct and indirect) would be more sensitive to ethical
transgressions and provide more suitable moral
solutions to novel AV moral dilemma scenarios.
Another expectation is that older drivers are more likely
to be married and have children of their own than younger
drivers, which would impact their commitment to
producing outcomes that are more desirable for the
overall society (e.g., protect adults who might be parents
of children, protect children).
Link 2b-4: Driving experience will have an impact on PMP.
-More experienced AV users will be more idealistic than less
experienced AV users
-More experienced AV users will be less relativistic than less
experienced AV users
The Intuitive Moral Judgment During AV
Moral Dilemma
More researchers emphasize the nonrationalist approach by
including intuition and/or emotion in the moral reasoning
process (Haidt, 2001; Saltzstein and Kasachkoff, 2004;
Cushman et al., 2006; Sonenshein, 2007; Ruedy et al., 2013;
Dedeke, 2015; Schwartz, 2016). As unexpected hazards
threaten the lives of traffic users during an AV moral
dilemma, intuition and/or emotion is expected to be an
important factor that impacts the moral judgment stage.
Moreover, intuitive moral reasoning is the response to the
individual’s framed moral issue. Thus, intuitive moral
reasoning mediates the issue framing stage and the rational
moral judgment stage. The “Integrated AV ethical decision-
making framework” suggests that both intuitive and cognitive
reasoning take place, thus supporting the dual-process theory of
ethical decision-making (Haidt, 2001; Dane and Pratt, 2007). This
section explains the intuitive moral reasoning process. We
propose the following proposition.
Link 3: The intuitive moral judgment stage mediates the
relationship between the AV moral dilemma issue framing
stage and the rational moral judgment stage.
Moral Intuition
Moral intuiting is a non-conscious cognitive process that occurs
quickly and effortlessly Kahneman (2003), Evans (2008) when an
individual perceives a morally salient context (Haidt, 2001;
Reynolds, 2006; Schwartz, 2016). The dual-process theory
explains that intuitive moral reasoning occurs automatically
and effortlessly prior to slow and effortful moral reasoning
(Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Haidt and Joseph, 2004;
Greene, 2007; Greene, 2009). However, there is a limitation of
this theory. The dual-process theory interprets emotional
processes as fast and unconscious, which oversimplifies the
moral reasoning process and may neglect the possibility of
conscious decision-making (Christensen and Sutton, 2012).
Moreover, studies show that people make automatic and
unconscious cognitive judgments based on their prior
experiences (Greenwald and Farnham, 2000; Bargh et al.,
2001; Dedeke, 2015). Consequently, this study does not
distinguish intuitive processes as automatic and unconscious
and cognitive moral reasoning as slow and conscious but
acknowledges that both intuition and cognition can
automatically occur during moral reasoning. In line with the
previous findings, this framework expects that AV occupants who
have not experienced AV accidents can automatically and
effortlessly make both intuitive and cognitive responses during
the AV moral dilemma because people have intuition and have
preliminary moral knowledge in vehicle accidents that can be
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extended to AV moral dilemma scenarios. In other words, when
an AV user faces an AV moral dilemma, a reflexive pattern-
matching process may be unconsciously started, and the best
prototype that matches the novel context that also matches the
user’s values will be more acceptable or understandable for
the user.
Moral Emotions
Moral emotion has been explicitly included in ethical decision-
making (Gaudine and Thorne, 2001; Salvador and Folger, 2009).
The following is a categorization of moral emotions that suggest
direct relations to ethical decision-making (Eisenberg, 2000;
Tangney et al., 2007), which can also be found during the AV
moral dilemma: 1) “Prosocial” Moral emotions (e.g., empathy,
sympathy, concern, or compassion). Prosocial behaviors such as
providing support or help had a link between sympathy (e.g.,
Carlo et al., 2011), and compassion is activated when the suffering
of others is viewed, which leads to altruistic moral actions (Goetz
et al., 2010), 2) “Self-Conscious” Moral Emotions (e.g., guilt,
shame, embarrassment). Emotions in this category are “evoked
by self-reflection and self-evaluation” (Tangney et al., 2007, p.
347). Feeling guilt results from recognizing how the other party
has been wronged, and thus leads to empathetic behaviors (de
Hooge et al., 2007). 3) “Other-blame” Moral emotions (e.g.,
contempt, anger, and disgust). People who feel anger tend to
attribute blame to others, thus aggregating aggressive behaviors
(Dix et al., 1990; Keltner et al., 1993), because anger is often
related to justice or fairness (Goldman, 2003). In addition, in a
study that explored dual-process reasoning during the AV moral
dilemma, moral emotions or related moral value codes in the
context of AV ethics that fall into these categories were found
(e.g., empathy, conscience, self-sacrifice, children-preservation,
kin preservation, passenger preservation, fault liability of self,
anger, and fault liability of others) (Rhim et al., 2020). Although
AV accidents are a new phenomenon, moral emotions or
emotional reactions toward a novel context will allow people
to determine what is ethical or not. Therefore, it is crucial to
include emotion as a mental process of moral reasoning during
the AV moral dilemma. In summary, this framework adopts that
individuals will respond to novel AV moral dilemma contexts
depending on their emotional responses (Sonenshein, 2007;
Dedeke, 2015).
Moral Reflection
In conventional crashes, moral reflection would rarely occur since
most crash avoidance behaviors are reflexive actions without
moral judgment. In contrast, when developing moral
behaviors of AVs, the inclusion of the moral reflection stage is
possible, which provides the opportunity to reflect upon contexts
to minimize conflict that could occur (e.g., consequences vs.
fairness). Dedeke (2015) explains that moral reflection focuses
on the factual review process, and the role of moral reflection
becomes more important when situations involve strong
automatic responses, both emotional and cognitive. Thus, the
following questions can be asked to reduce bias and minimize
immediate reactions based on reflexive judgment. “Do I have all
the facts to make my conclusion? Am I interpreting the facts in
the correct way? Am I using the correct frame of reference?”
(Dedeke, 2015, p.447). In this regard, the moral reflection stage
during an AV moral dilemma will promote more accurate
processing of information leading to more acceptable decisions
for overall society.
Moral reflection occurs after reviewing facts that would occur
during a moral dilemma (e.g., what will be the consequences of
each decision? Whose liability will it be? What would be the
fairest decision?). Reidenbach and Robin (1990) specified
dimensions of moral reflection: The relativistic dimension
evaluates whether a decision is traditionally acceptable or not
and whether it is culturally appropriate or not. Further, the
contractualism dimension evaluates whether unspoken
promises or unwritten contracts are violated or not. These
dimensions are derived from moral philosophies (Reidenbach
and Robin, 1990). The relativistic and contractualism dimensions
can be referenced in the AVmoral reflection stage to induce more
ethical and socially acceptable AV decisions. For example, one of
the AV moral dilemma scenarios includes “Comply with road
traffic laws which results in maximized overall harms” (Rhim
et al., 2020, p. 44). An initial automatic intuition would perceive
that following traffic rules is ethical. However, if the consequences
result in multiple fatalities, the decision may not be ethical nor
socially acceptable. As AVs can be preprogrammed, various
consequences and reflections should be included in the
algorithms. In summary, based on previous studies, this
framework emphasizes the role of the moral rationalization
process Dedeke (2015), Schwartz (2016), especially after
reflexive moral reasoning, because reasoning that occurred
quickly may not consider the full spectrum of the problem
(Sonenshein, 2007).
Rational Moral Reasoning During AV Moral
Dilemma
This study includes varying factors that impact intuitive and
rational moral judgment either directly or potentially in ethical
decision-making to explain the dual-process theory in the AV
moral dilemma. How rational moral reasoning is shaped and
impacts ethical intention will be explained in this section.
Rational Moral Judgment
In accordance with Dedeke’s (2015) cognitive-intuitionist model,
this framework provides an explanation of pluralistic moral
reasoning judgment patterns. First, moral judgment could be
mainly based on an AV user’s intuitive reaction toward the
framed moral issue. Second, moral judgment could be
established mostly on rational judgment, in which intuition is
less evoked. Third, a moral judgment could rely on both intuition
and rational reasoning. In this case, the automatic reasoning
process is the basis for moral reflection and rational reasoning
process. In the AV moral dilemma, if one is directly impacted or
involved in the AV accident, moral intuition would be more likely
to be activated. For instance, if an AV user feels compassion
toward pedestrians during an AV accident, he or she will tend to
make moral judgments that could preserve pedestrians over other
involved traffic users. Or if the decision-maker is a bystander of
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an AV accident who is not impacted by the accidents, moral
emotion would be less significant, and the rational reasoning
process will become more dominant. For this reason, intuitive
moral reasoning impacts the rational moral judgment process.
Moreover, how the decision-maker frames the moral issue
impacts the moral reasoning process (Dedeke, 2015). Moral
issue frames can explain why people prefer utilitarian AVs,
but do not want to buy such AVs. Utilitarian AVs, which
intend to save the most lives, seem ethical from the observer’s
perspective. However, if the decision is made from the first-
person perspective, there is a possibility that the decision-maker
can be sacrificed to reduce overall harm. In other words, the
moral judgment stage is impacted by how the specific AV moral
dilemma is framed by an individual, which is impacted by PMI.
Hence, the following propositions are developed:
Link 4a: Intuitive moral judgment processes impact rational
moral judgment processes.
Link 4b: PMI impacts rational moral judgment. For stronger
PMI, an AV user will face a more challenging moral reasoning
process.
Ethical Behavioral Intent in AV Moral Dilemma
An AV user’s contemplation in the moral judgment stage,
whether intuitive, rational, or both, leads to the individual’s
intention to make either ethical or unethical behaviors during
an AV moral dilemma. Researchers agree that emotions impact
ethical decision-making. Bagozzi and Pieters (1998) explained
that different emotions have discrete goals, thus leading to
different behaviors. Moreover, different emotions lead to
different moral actions or ethical behavioral intent (EBI)
(Blasi, 1999). For instance, the empathy-altruism hypothesis
explains that empathy evokes emotions of concern to others
who are suffering, which is the driving motivation of altruistic
or prosocial behaviors (Batson et al., 1988; Persson and
Kajonius, 2016). Similar findings were found in AV moral
dilemmas. The dominant moral emotions found for “Moral
Altruist” were guilt and empathy. People in this group tend to
make decisions that emphasize the safety of overall traffic users,
including protecting negligent drivers (Rhim et al., 2020). In
the case when cognition is more activated when making EBI, an
individual will compare possible actions based on his or her
moral principles Bastons (2008) and try to prioritize certain
moral values over others to determine moral consequences
(Melé, 2005; Craft, 2013). When applied to the AV moral
dilemma, an individual’s rational behavior intention would
be to minimize overall harm, consider liability, follow road
traffic rules, distribute responsibility, or protect a certain party
(e.g., cyclists, pedestrians, and passengers in AV). In summary,
this study postulates that understanding the impact of both
intuition and cognition will provide a more concrete
understanding of the connection between moral judgment
and moral EBI. Hence, the following propositions are
developed:
Link 5a: The intuitive moral judgment stage impacts EBI
during the AV moral dilemma.
Link 5b: The rational moral judgment stage impacts EBI
during the AV moral dilemma.
DISCUSSION
This study illustrates an “Integrative ethical decision-making
framework for the AV moral dilemma” to provide an
alternative perspective to the conventional trolley problem-
based AV ethics. This framework fills in research gaps by
explaining pluralistic nature of AV ethical decision-making
patterns that reflect the public’s perspectives, which in turn
advances social value embedded AV ethics.
The following is the theoretical implication of this study.
While many researchers agree with the need for an AV ethics
framework to provide explanations of ethical behaviors of AVs,
the existing models show only a limited aspect of AV moral
reasoning. The “Integrated AV ethical decision-making
framework” is one of the first models that provides a
comprehensive explanation of the full ethical decision-making
process by defining various variables related to the AV moral
dilemma. The relationships among the constructs show the step-
by-step ethical intention shaping process, which includes both
intuitive and cognitive moral reasoning processes. Moreover, the
detailed examples and propositions provided in this study
overcome the limitation of studies adopting scenario-based
methodologies. For instance, understanding the moral issue
framing stage may aid in minimizing preconstructed
interpretations in the scenarios (e.g., locus of control impacts
moral judgment). Therefore, the framework in this study allows
consideration of multiple aspects of the AV moral dilemma to
discuss realistic AV ethics.
The social contributions of the study are as follows. First, a
social value embedded AV ethics framework will provide
explainable and transparent AV ethics for prospective users.
Singhapakdi et al. (1999) explain that individuals could select
ethically questionable decisions simply because they are
unfamiliar with the moral issue. Similar trends can be found
in AV moral dilemmas because not many people have
experienced the novel context of AV involved crashes. Hence,
AV instructions based on the framework may help potential users
recognize frequently occurring morally salient situations.
Moreover, clarification of which ethical decisions of AVs may
be more appropriate is likely to enhance recognition of AV
crashes with moral saliency and ultimately lead to less
unethical AV crash selections. Second, regulators could
develop more realistic AV ethical frameworks by considering
alternatives to trolley problem-based ethics. Researchers advise
that vague AV guidelines should be avoided (De Freitas et al.,
2020b). Further, it is widely accepted that regulations are difficult
to modify once implemented. Therefore, it is crucial to develop
acceptable AVs in the first place. Consequently, establishing
realistic and transparent AV ethics would facilitate
communication with the public, which will, in turn, increase
trust in AV systems. Ultimately, this will prepare the overall
society to build socially acceptable AVs.
The following are the technological implications of this study.
First, the model offers an alternative perspective to the trolley
problem-based AV ethics, which often assumes onemoral theory,
such as utilitarianism. The propositions provided in this study
bring to light that assumptions of ethical behaviors of AVs should
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be reevaluated (e.g., different cultures will prefer different AV
ethical behaviors). Toward addressing this issue, researchers have
recently modeled three AV ethical decision-making algorithms
(contractarian, utilitarian, and egalitarian) based on a Markov
Decision Process (MDP) to react when moral dilemma situation
is detected (De Moura et al., 2020). Although the AV decisions
from the MDP provide an implementation of pluralistic AV
moral behaviors, this model does not consider the intuitive aspect
of users. Second, while it might not be feasible to directly program
intuitions into AV algorithms, considering moral emotions and
the intuiting process that occurs during the AV moral dilemma
may enhance prospective users’ acceptance and interpretation of
AVs, as well as provide inspirations for engineers. For instance,
current AVs are typically programmed with opaque, deep neural
networks for fast, low-level processing, along with transparent
conditional logic for high-level decision-making (Karpathy,
2020). The level at which to separate these two systems is still
an active research topic, including the exploration of completely
end-to-end System 1 approaches using reinforcement learning
(Kuutii et al., 2020). An analysis of System 1 and System 2 in
human ethical decision-making may be a way forward in
designing systems that balance effectiveness and explanatory
power. Third, human-centered AI (HCAI) provides clear goals
to achieve reliable, safe, and trustworthy AI-embedded systems
Shneiderman (2020), yet how to achieve these goals is unclear.
The variables used in this study such as individual and cultural
factors, perceived moral intensity, and possible decision-making
patterns can aid engineers in considering machine translatable
ethical AV behaviors. For example, in creating AV systems that
may be deployed worldwide to different countries, AV developers
could integrate tweakable parameters based on situationist vs.
exceptionist differences, such as the ability to transgress rules of
the road depending on the consequence to the group. As another
example, surveys of AV users can be interpreted through the lens
of individual factors such as education, age, and their expected
moral responses, rather than taken as a whole.
The proposed “Integrative ethical decision-making
framework for the AV moral dilemma” is not free of
limitations. First, the framework is conceptual and suggests
propositions that are not empirically tested. The detailed
moral preferences cannot be measured. Future studies could
empirically validate the framework Preferences for Precepts
Implied in Moral Theories (PPIMT) instrument Dubljević
et al. (2018), which “assess respondents’ preference for the
precepts implied in the three dominant moral theories”
Dubljević (2020), can be used for empirical validation of
AV users’ moral judgment tendencies. Measuring PPIMT
will provide a more concrete understanding of how the AV
moral dilemma context activates users’ preference of a specific
ethical theory. Second, this model focused mainly on an
individual AV user’s moral judgment. However, AVs will be
deployed in mixed traffic scenarios where multiple traffic users
are involved (e.g., other AVs, conventional cars, pedestrians,
passengers, and cyclists) (Nyholm and Smids, 2018;
Ranasinghe et al., 2020). The framework or theory can be
expanded to describe the interrelationship between multiple
traffic users to understand accountable AV moral reasoning in
a broader sense. A future study can reference the “Integrated
AV ethical decision-making model” when developing social
values embedded algorithms and user interfaces. Finally, while
this study focused specifically on AV morality, AI-embedded
technologies such as social robots will face similar moral
conundrums. In the future, this framework may be
extended to other related fields to provide a foundational
theory to strengthen the field of AI ethics and roboethics.
CONCLUSION
This study attempts to fill in research gaps that appear in the
existing AV ethics models by providing a comprehensive
theoretical framework. It does so by defining key AV moral
dilemma-related factors and merging them together into an
integrative framework that includes both the intuitive and
cognitive moral reasoning processes. More specifically, this
study explains how an individual frames the AV moral
dilemma, impacted by individual characteristics and PMP,
which will in turn be the reference for intuitive and cognitive
moral reasoning leading to EBI. The proposed integrated
framework can be considered to reflect the “person-situation”
interactionist perspective Trevino (1986) as well as the “cognitive-
intuitionist” approach (Dedeke, 2015). Consequently, the
framework embeds the dual-process theory and provides
explanations for moral pluralism of AV ethics that includes
the intuitive moral reasoning.
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